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Case No. 16872 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AND CROSS APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act against South Jordan City by three subdividers for a 
determination as to the validity of certain ordinances and 
regulations relating to water connection fees and park improvement 
fees. 
Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that the water con-
nection fee of South Jordan City: (1) constitutes an unlawful 
taking of property without due process of law; (2) that the fee 
is unreasonable and constitutes an unlawful and unconstitutional 
tax on the plaintiffs; (3) that the park improvement fee con-
stitutes an unlawful taking of property without due process of 
law; (4) that the park improvement fee is unreasonable in its 
amount and also constitutes an unlawful taking; and (5) that 
the water connection fee and park improvement fee constitutes 
P~onomic discrimination against the plaintiffs in violation 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code. Plaintiffs 
sought a temporary restraining order, a declaration that the 
ordinances as applied are unconstitutional and void, and money 
damages. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Dean Conder granted Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Count I of the Complaint and entered a 
permanent injunction restraining and enjoining South Jordan 
City from requiring the payment of the water connection fee 
for each lot by the plaintiff subdividers as a condition for 
final plat approval. 
The lower court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
as to Counts III, IV and V and held that the park improvement 
fee was valid. 
On January 2, 1980, the trial court entered its order 
denying the Defendant's Motion to Alter and/or Amend the 
Judgment. This appeal was taken by the defendant on 
January 16, 1980. (R. 71). Plaintiffs cross-appealed from 
the Order dismissing the Third, Fourth and Fifth Causes of 
Action on January 30, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the lower court order 
nullifying the water connection fee charged subdividers as a 
prerequisite to water service. Plaintiffs also cross-appeal 
and seek an order of this Court that the park recreation fee 
is also void or, in the alternative, seek the remand of that 
issue to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because plaintiffs-subdividers are both respondents and 
cross-appellants, they will be referred to as "plaintiffs" and 
South Jordan City as "defendant" throughout this brief for the 
convenience of this Court and the parties. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the Statement of Facts contained 
in the South Jordan City brief with certain limited exceptions. 
Defendant failed to note that the parties stipulated that it was 
necessary for any developer to pay a "Park Improvement Fee" in the 
sum of $235 per dwelling unit before being allowed to connect 
to the city's water main. (R. 102-103). While it is true that 
plaintiffs have "repeatedly admitted that defendant-appellant 
city has the right to collect a water connection fee," plaintiffs 
have never admitted that such fee now charged by the city is 
reasonable or that the method of computation charged for the 
subdividers is reasonable. Rather, plaintiffs have admitted that 
some type of connection fee is justified both as to the connection 
made by the subdividers to the city's water line and as to the 
charge to each individual property owner to the subdivision water 
line. 
The magnitude of the ordinances in question was also omitted 
by the defendant city. The collective amounts owing to the city 
by the three plaintiff subdividers is in the area of a quarter of 
a million dollars in water connection fees and park improvement 
fees. (R. 126). Under the present statutory scheme, this amount 
of money would have to be paid to the city before a single resident 
completed his home on one of the approximately 40U lots presently 
-3-
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being developed by the plaintiffs. 
Finally, defendant omits to note that plaintiffs have 
cross-appealed in this case as to the lower court's order 
dismissing their complaint for the imposition of a park fee 
to be paid by plaintiffs prior to water service being commenced. 
Plaintiffs will first respond to the arguments raised by 
South Jordan City in its brief and will then assert its own 
arguments on its cross-appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
.POINT I 
.THE:'TRIA:U COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AS TO THE INVALIDITY OF THE WATER CONNECTION PRE-
PAYMENT FEE. 
This controversy concerns the imposition of water connection 
fees by the defendant upon the plaintiffs, who are real estate 
subdividers. Each of the plaintiffs own parcels of land within 
the South Jordan City boundaries and have undertaken to develop 
these parcels into residential housing subdivisions. 
The South Jordan City Council enacted Ordinance No. 13-1-5 
(Exhibit D-1) which stated the following: 
Application for water connection by sub-
di viders. Whenever a subdivider desires or 
requires to install a water connection and 
extension for a subdivision, the subdivider 
shall enter into a written extension agreement 
which shall constitute an application for per-
mission to make said extension and connection 
and an agreement specifying the terms and 
conditions under which the water extensions and 
connections shall be made and the payment that 
shall be required. 
Accordingly, a "Subdivision Water Service Extension Agreement" 
was devised by the defendant corporation. (Exhibit D-2) • 
-4-
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The Extension Agreement required various plans, bonds, and 
inspections concerning the construction of a water system and 
provides requirements which are generally in accordance with 
other extension agreements of surrounding counties. 
However, paragraph 10 of the Extension Agreement is unique 
to South Jordan City. It states the following: 
Cost of Construction. The Applicant hereby 
agrees to bear the total cost of constructing 
all water lines required for the servicing of the 
subdivision or development (to include extensions 
from existing city water mains to the subdivision, 
the water system within the subdivision and service 
lines to each lot in the subdivision). In con-
sideration therefor, the city shall charge the 
Applicant a connection fee in the amount of 
$ for each individual dwelling to be 
served within the subdivision, which sums shall be 
payable in full to the city before the subdivision 
system is connected to any existing city water main. 
(Emphasis added. ) 
It is thus undisputed by the parties that the Extension 
Agreement now in effect and required to be signed by all real 
estate developers provides that the developer must pay to the 
city the aggregate dollar amount of all the potential water 
connection fees within that subdivision. In other words, if 
the subdivision would support 100 homes, the developer must pay 
100 times the water connection fee to the city before the city 
will allow the subdivision to be connected to the city water 
supply. This is true even if there are no homes in the 
subdivision which are actually.using the water. 
A. Defendant's Fee Structure for Water Connection is 
Contrary to Utah Statutory Law. 
Plaintiffs do not disagree with defendant that municipalities 
in Utah are granted broad powers for the protection of the health 
-5-
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and welfare of their residents. Neither do plaintiffs disagree 
that a variety of state laws have been enacted concerning the 
powers of municipalities to provide water and sewer services. 
(Brief of South Jordan City, pp. 8-9). 
Plaintiffs do dispute, however, the right of South Jordan 
City to charge plaintiffs a "use or service" charge when no 
"use or service" has actually been performed. Utah law is 
clear that the city in this instance is acting well beyond its 
statutory power. 
This Court on at least two occasions has held that sewer 
connection fees are neither revenue measures, taxes, nor assess-
ments but are payments for services furnished. Murray City v. 
Board of Education of Murray City School District, 16 U.2d 115, 
396 P.2d 628 (1964); Home Builders Association of Greater Salt Lake 
vs. Provo City, 28 U.2d 402, 503 P.2.d 451 (1972). Likewise, 
this Court in the recent case of Rupp v. Grantsville City, slip 
opinion (Utah, March 27, 1980), held that an ordinance requiring 
a $300 sewer hookup connection charge was proper since each person 
required to join the system benefited from its use. 
There is no specific Utah case concerning a connection fee 
for water service. All prior cases have dealt solely with sewer 
hookups. However, Utah statutory law explicitly gives cities 
the power to couple water service with s·ewage service. Section 
10-8-38, Utah Code Annotated (the section cited by the lower 
court in its decision) requires mandatory hookups to any sewer 
system when the sewer "is available and within 300 feet of any 
property line with any building used for human occupancy" and 
provides that the town may charge for <:2:: ~~ ~ 
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In addition, the law states that when the city is also operating 
its own water works system that it may make one charge for both 
water service and sewer serviceG In the event an occupant fails 
to hook up to the sewer service the town is authorized to shut 
off the water until such time as the hookup into the sewer has 
occurred. 
In the instant case, Defendant was not operating its 
own sewer system but was contracting this to a sewer improvement 
district. Section 17-6-22, U.C.A. (also relied upon by the lower 
ourt) provides that it may also charge its water fee concurrently 
with the sewer fee and that the enforcement may be secured in the 
same manner as that enumerated in Section 10-8-38. This Court 
in ~ supra. also approved the use of the discontinuance of 
water service as a method of enforcing mandatory sewer connec-
tions. 
Defendant relies upon Section 10-7-10 which states that a 
city does not have to "furnish" water unless the owner agrees 
in writing that he will pay for all water furnished to any 
"house, tenement, apartment, building, place, premises or lots." 
This provision is nearly identical to Section 10-8-38, u.c.A., 
which also permits a city to require the owner to agree to pay 
for both sewer and water before such services need be furnished. 
It is thus obvious that the Utah legislature has treated 
sewer and water connections as virtually inseparable. It can 
thus fairly be said that if a sewer hookup fee is a payment 
for services furnished (Murray City, supra, and Home Builders 
Association of Greater Salt Lake, supra), then the connection of 
a water line is also a payment for services furnished. 
-7-
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The Legislature did not require the hookup of a sewer 
system in areas where there is not a building used for human 
occupancy within 300 feet of the sewer line. Thus, an owner of 
an empty lot does not have to pay a sewer hookup fee. There is 
likewise no requirement that the owner of a vacant lot must pay 
a water hookup fee, although such an owner could, if he desired, 
request water service to the empty lot and would under the terms 
of Section 10-7-10 be required to pay for the cost of furnishing 
the water. Thus, if the hundreds of lots involved in this 
litigation were all sold tomorrow to separate purchasers, the city 
could not mandate them to connect either to the sewer or to the 
water lines until such time as buildings used for human occupancy 
had been completed. 
In an effort to avoid the statutory commandment, Defendant 
has sought to charge plaintiffs the water connection fee for 
each and every lot in the subdivision prior to any building on 
the lots by individuals. Defendant has attempted to do this not 
by ordinance but by its "Subdivision Water Service Extension 
Agreement," which supplements the ordinance. 
The city has incurred no pecuniary expenditure whatsoever 
in the development of these subdivisions. Paragraph 10 of the 
Agreement required plaintiff to "bear the total cost of construc-
ting all ~ater lines required for the servicing of the subdivision 
or development." Plaintiffs have completely built the water 
system within the subdivision and have only asked to connect 
to the pre-existing city water lines. For this privilege, 
defendant city has sought a "connection charge" not for the one 
c1 
Cl 
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connection to the main line, but for the aggregate of potential 
connections to the subdividers' total number of lots. 
Utah statutory law clearly does not allow this type of 
action. Defendant city is attempting to charge for a use and 
service to hundreds of lots when in fact there has been no use 
or service to any lot. Aside from the fact that the subdivision 
water pipes would be full of city water, the city itself has 
suffered no loss nor has it had to increase any of its services 
to provide water. The city is asking for a total of nearly $300,000 
because three feeder pipes of three subdivisions have been attached 
to the existing water lines of the city. Defendant city is therefore 
given a windfall of some $300,000 when it has, in fact, done 
nothing or incurred no further obligation than before the sub-
division systems were hooked into the city lines. 
Plaintiffs have already incurred substantial expenses in 
laying the water system within the subdivision itself. It is 
not the responsibility of plaintiffs to contribute to the city 
water system's construction and maintenance when it does not in 
fact use such system. Under Utah law there are several ways a 
city may provide funds for a water system. First, Section 
10-7-7, U.C.A. allows the city to issue bonds for the purpose of 
supplying the city with water. Similarly, the Metropolitan Water 
District Act provides that if a water district is created bonds 
may be issued. Section 73~8-26 to Section 73-8-31, U.C.A. 
The municipality may also establish a special improvement 
district and charge a special assessment for capital improvements 
under the provisions of Section 10-15-1, U.C.A., the "Municipal 
-9-
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Impnovement District Act." Under the provisions of this Act, 
procedures are required in which the property owners are given 
notice of proposed improvements and hearings must be held before 
the special improvement district can be created. Section 
10-16-4 through Section 10-16-7, u.c.A. The assessment allowed 
in such a special improvement district is stated as follows: 
Assessments shall be levied on all nlocks, lots, 
parts of lots, tracts or parcels of property 
bounding, abutting upon or adjacent to the 
improvements or which may be inspected or 
specially benefited by the improvements to the 
extent of the benefits to such property by 
reasons of the improvements . . . Assessments 
shall be equal and uniform adcording to the 
benefits received. 
In the instant case the City of South Jordan has not elected 
to either issue bonds nor to create a special assessment tax 
for a water system. Instead, the city has required the plaintiffs 
to provide their own internal subdivision water systems. Any 
external water system feeding such subdivision should be financed 
by the entire community through either bonds, assessment dis-
tricts. 
Defendant South Jordan City argues repeatedly that Section 
10-7-10 gives the city statutory authority to require the fee 
imposed against the plaintiffs in this case. As noted previously, 
this section states that a town does not have to furnish water to 
its inhabitants for "the use in any house, tenement, apartment, 
building, place, premises or lots" unless the owner signs an 
application that he will pay for all water "furnished." Defen-
dant's argument continues that it has furnished water since it is 
now flowing through the subdivision's line and thus a water 
-10-
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connection fee should be collected by the city. 
Defendant's argument is entirely without merit. Section 
10-7-10 was written for the express purpose of requiring owners 
of property to be responsible for the use of any water on that 
property even though it is an agent or tenant which utilizes the 
water. Under the city's argument the subdividers would be "owners" 
and would therefore be responsible for all future use of the 
water in the subdivision and would be perpetually assessed a 
monthly charge for all water consumed by all residents of the 
three subdivisions. This clearly is not what the defendant 
intended in its own Agreement. Specifically, in fact, paragraph 6 
of Defendant's Subdivision Water Service Agreement" states the 
following: 
As each house is connected to the line, 
the owner thereof shall be required to sign the 
city's standard application for service and 
agree to abide by the city's rules and regula-
tions and to pay the city's monthly service 
charge. All repair and maintenance expenses for 
water facilities and lines located on irtdividual 
lots within the subdivision or development shall 
be borne by the respective owners of said lot. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is obvious from this language that the city fully intended 
that each lot owner would be responsible for his own water charges 
and that separate agreements would be written between the city 
and each lot owner. The city cannot, on the one hand, say that 
plaintiffs own the entire subdivision and are thus responsible 
for the connectin fee while, at the same time, saying that the 
monthly charges should be assessed to the individual lot owners. 
Clearly, both the connectionfee and the monthly fees are proper 
service charges only to the lot owner and not to the subdivider. 
-11-
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In conclusion, plaintiffs do not dispute that city may 
charge the three subdi viders a "connection fee'' based upon the 
expenses actually incurred in connecting the subdividers' 
lines to the water line of the city. Such a charge would be 
legitimate since it would cover the cost actually incurred. 
However, for the city to charge each subdivider for the aggregate 
number of potential lots which may utilize the system is clearly 
an abuse of any intended statutory authority a city may have in 
charging hookup fees. For these reasons, the trial court was 
correct in finding that Utah law does not permit this type of 
fee scheme. 
B. Defendant's Fee Structure for Water Connection is 
Contrary to the Utah Constitution and the United States Consti-
tution. 
The present Extension Agreement how required by South 
Jordan City violates Article I, Section 2 and Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution as well as the "Equal Protection" and "Due 
t 
Process" clauses of the United States Constitution. This violation 
occurs because of a wrongful taking of property (the hookup 
fees) and because of an unequal application of the fees to 
differing persons within the same class of people. 
As to Plaintiffs' first contention of taking of property withe 
due process, the case of Stanfield v. Burnett, 353 P.2d 242 (Or. 
1960) is closely on point. In that case a local ordinance was 
enacted which required charges for property whether connected 
or not to a sewer system and which required various charges 
based upon the type of property involved. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon rejected the ordinance as a 
-12-
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valid assessment and held that the charges were not based upon 
total construction costs and "any attempted assessment prior to 
construction in determination of total costs is nullity." Id. 
at 245. The court then stated: 
Since the amounts attempted to be collected are not 
assessments, may they be justified as charges for 
use? Obviously not, since the charges are not 
based upon use but upon the fact that the property 
was within 200 feet of the sewer line. 
* * * 
Because there is no constitutional or statutory 
authority in this state for making a charge for 
Prospective use, we hold such charge may not be 
made unless it is levied as an assessment, which 
was not done here. We say this for several reasons. 
First, if it be sustained as a charge for prospective 
use, then it would necessarily follow that it was 
based upon benefit to the property and not upon the 
user, and, hence, it could only be sustained if it 
was a valid assessment under the rules above 
referred to. Secondly, a charge for the use of a 
sewer is not a tax or assessment but is a charge for 
a service rendered and is based upon contract. 
* * * 
The trans:action really amounts to an offer by the 
municipal corporationand an acceptance by the party 
who takes the water, thus forming a contract. Since 
there was no actual user shown in this case, there 
could be no acceptance, and hence, no contract. There-
fore, it is inescapable that Plaintiff by this proceeding 
is attempting to confiscate private property without 
any legal basis therefor. The fact that the property 
may have been incidentally benefited is not enough in 
the absence of statutory or constitutional authority. 
Id. at 246. (Emphasis added.) 
This same argument against "prospective" use is applicable 
in the instant case since the Plaintiffs are being forced to pay 
for water connection fees where the Plaintiffs themselves will 
re.cei ve no service or benefit and no burden will be imposed on 
the city until such time as individual property owners occupy 
each lot. If the city is attempting to obtain construction funds 
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for a city-wide water system, it is obligated to issue bonds or 
create a special assessment district for such purposes rather 
than to attempt utilization of a "hookup" fee for such purpose. 
Even in cases where a city has created a special assessment 
district for the purpose of making capital improvements, the 
courts have uniformly held that any ordinance which requires a 
property owner to pay an assessment fee for which his property 
does not receive an immediate benefit is unconstitutional. 
In City and County of Denver v. Greenspoon, 344 P.2d 679 (Colo. 
1959) the Colorado Supreme Court held that a special assessment 
tax would amount to confiscation without due process of law when 
it was not shown that the property included in the assessment 
area would receive a benefit and in fact it was shown that the 
property could never use the improvement. 
The court in that case quoted a previous Colorado decision 
in which the rule was stated; 
Special assessments for local improvements are 
authorized and permitted upon the theory that the 
property against which they are levied derives some 
special, immediate, and peculiar benefits by reason 
of the improvement, other, in addition to, and 
different from that enjoyed by other property in the 
community outside of the district in which the improve-
ment is made. 344 P.2d at 681 (Emphasis added.) 
Defendant's reliance upon Call v. City of West Jordan, 
606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) is misplaced. In that case this 
Court upheld an ordinance which required a subdivider to dedicate 
seven percent of its land to the city or pay an equivalent in 
cash for flood control and/or park and recreation facilities. 
In a three to two decision this Court concluded that under 
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general statutory authority the city was empowered to provide 
for its parks and flood controls and could legitimately require 
a sµbdivider to contribute either land or money to this end. 
While Plaintiffs disagree with the majority holding in 
this case, as will be discussed infra, this case relates to 
parks and flood control which are entirely different from the 
statutory requirements of water use fees. Whereas the city 
may be obligated to provide flood control and parks for its 
citizens regardless of whether it is requested to or not, 
the city does not have to provide water connections for 
individuals who do not desire to utilize the water service. 
Thus, while a city can legitimately assess a lot owner for 
flood control, for parks, and for capital improvements, it cannot 
force the lot owner to pay a "connection fee" to a water line 
when there is no building on the lot requiring the mandatory 
sewer connection. 
A requirement that the plaintiffs pay a fee for services 
whichwillnever be rendered to them as subdividers and which require 
plaintiff to pay 100 percent of the "hookup" charges when no 
hookups have occurred is clearly a taking of property without 
due process. Since there is no assurance that any of these 
lots will ever be hooked up to the city water system, the con-
stitutional violation is even greater. 
In addition, the application cf the Extension Agreement 
also violates the "equal protection" clause of the Utah and United 
States Constitutions since it is treating plaintiffs- subdividers 
differently from other owners of residential property. 
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The ordinance as written does not violate constitutional 
principles. However, the ordinance as applied by its extension 
agreement does create unfair discrimination. The rule has been 
stated as follows: 
A law, though fair on its face and impartial in 
appearance, which is of such a nature that it 
may be applied and administered with an evil 
eye and unequal hand so as to make an unjust 
and illegal discrimination is, when so applied 
and administered, within the prohibition of the 
Federal Constitution. Hence, in a consideration 
of the classification embodied in a statute, 
regard should be given not only to its final 
purpose but likewise to the means provided for 
its administration. 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 
540, pp. 929-930. 
This same authority also makes the following distinction: 
Due process of law is denied when any particular person 
of a class or of the community is singled out for 
the imposition of restraints or burdens not imposed 
upon, and to be borne by, all of the class or of 
the community at large, unless the imposition or 
restraint is based upon existing distinctions that 
di.fferentiate the particular individuals of the 
class to be affected from the body of the community. 
16 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 551, pp. 950-951. 
In this case, the Plaintiff subdividers are required to pay 
in advance for services to all lots in the subdivisions even 
though no service is rendered. On theother hand, an individual 
property owner who owns his own lot and who is not in a sub-
division is only required to pay the fee at the time the connec-
tion is actually amde. There is no valid distinction between 
these two classes of individuals since in both cases the services 
of the city are not used until the connection is made and no 
greater burden is placed upon the city in either case. 
In addition, the present application is discriminatory 
against Plaintiff when compared to previous subdividers who 
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developed their property prior to the formulation of the 
extension agreement. 1 These subdividers were not required to 
prepay the water fee before being able to build upon their 
property. 
In the case of Watts v. Alpine City, 4th Dist. Ct. No. 48-518 
(1979) two plaintiffs filed an action against Alpine City alleging 
that an impact fee which required them to pay 1.5 percent of the 
total valuation of any new construction before a building permit 
was issued was a denial of equal protection of the law since 
old residents whose homes had previously been built did not have 
to pay this impact fee. In ruling on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
the Honorable George Ballif in granting plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment stated the following: 
Alpine City's so-called impact fee, Ordinance 
No. 02-77, enacted February 14, 1977, puts 
an undue and discriminatory burden upon the 
new building residents of Alpine City as con-
trasted with the old residents whose homes 
have been built since the impact fee was placed 
in effect. Said ordinance, therefore, is in 
violation of the fundamental rights established 
in Section 2 of Article 1 of the Utah State 
Constitution granting citizens equal protection 
of law. 
This Court recently in the case of Continental Bank and 
Trust Company v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1979) 
again stated the principle that a law is discriminatory in the 
sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional where some persons 
or transactions excluded from the operation of law are, as to 
its subject matter, in no different class than those included 
in its operation. See also Weber Basin Home Builders Association 
v. Roy City, 487 P.2d 866 (Utah 1971). 
-17-
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discriminatory since it charged new residents higher rates than 
older residents) . 
Here, an owner of a vacant lot in South Jordan City which 
has a city water line running next to it is not obligated to pay 
the $1,000 "connection fee" until such time as he builds a 
building and installs a sewer. On the other hand, plaintiffs who 
presently own hundreds of lots are required to pay these "hookup 
charges" even though the water is never hooked up and even though 
it will never be used by the plaintiffs. In addition, other 
subdividers who have built in thearea previously did not have to 
incur the prepayment penalties and were thus given an unfair 
economic advantage over plaintiffs. 
For these reasons, as an alternate ground, the ordinance 
as supplemented by the Water Serv~ce Agreement is patently un-
constitutional. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PARKS 
IMPROVEMENT FEE. 
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' Third, Fourth 
and Fifth Causes of Action finding that "no stat.utory prohibition 
exists as collecting park fees in advance and that such fees 
are valid and do not violate the due process nor equal protection 
provisions of the Constitution." (R. 54). It is from this 
Order that plaintiffs cross appeal. 
A. There is No Statutory Authority Allowing the City to 
Charge the ~ark Improvement fee, and, in Addition, Such Fee is 
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Unconstitutional. 
Plaintiffs adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice Wilkins 
and Maughn in Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 
222-229 in support of their argument that Utah law does not 
allow the city of South Jordan to charge a park improvement 
fee to plaintiffs when such park will never be utilized by 
plaintiffs and any parks built will be for the benefit of the 
city as a whole. 
Plaintiffs would urge this Court to reexamine its decision 
in Call in light of the circumstances of this case. Unlike the 
cases relied upon by defendants in Call, there are no state 
statutes authorizing either a fee or dedication of land for 
park purposes. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of Greater East 
Bay Incorporated v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 
1971) (Section 11546 of the Business and Professional Code) . 
Unlike these states, Utah statutory authority only gives its 
cities the power to make assessments or levy taxes for the 
benefit of its park system. 
The imposition of a park fee as a condition for completion 
of a water system shows the extremes in which this type of scheme 
can carry. In addition, the city of South Jordan has placed the 
park funds obtained from the plaintiffs into its general funding 
which, as Justice Wilkins observed, is contrary to previous Utah 
law requiring special funds to be established. 606 P.2d at 
228-229. 
If Utah wishes to utilize a land planning concept it should 
do so by means of specific statutory authority as has been done in 
'"".,..,.....,,,..,.. c:+rt-t-Ps. To allow or require the taking of money and property 
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of private individuals and corporations for these purposes, 
without statutory authority, is clearly an ultra vires act on 
the part of municipalities. It is for the legislature, not 
the courts, to provide a statutory system which meets consti-
tutional requirements if land or money is to be appropriated. 
For this reason, plaintiffs respectfully request that the 
Call decision be reconsidered in light of the circumstances :of 
this case. 
B. In the Alternative, the Reasonableness of the Park 
Impact Fee Must be Decided by a Full Evidentiary Hearing. 
Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action allege that the $235 
park improvement fee "is far in excess of defendant's cost for 
developing and maintaining the said park," and in their Fifth 
Cause of Action maintain that plaintiffs will not derive any 
benefit from the payment of a park improvement fee. Thus, 
plaintiffs assert that the statutory fee is unnecessary for the 
development of a park system in the subdivision and is in excess 
of any reasonable amount to be levied for such purposes. 
This Court in Call v. City of West Jordan, slip opinion 
(filed June 27, 1980, Utah) on rehearing stated that a dedication 
of private land or a substitute fee "should have some reasonable 
relationship to the need created by the subdivision." This 
Court then quoted a Missouri case which stated: 
... If the burden cast upon the subdivider is 
reasonably attributable to his activity, then 
the requirement [of dedication or fees in lieu 
thereof] is permissible; if not, it is forbidden 
and amounts to a confiscation of private property 
in contravention of the constitutional prohibition 
rather than reasonable regulations of the police 
power. Insofar as the esuablishment of a sub-
division within the city increas~2 
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needs of the city, then to that extent the cost 
of meeting that increase indeed may reasonably 
be required of the subdivider. 
Quoting Homebuilders Association of Greater Kansas City 
v. City of Kansas, 555 s.w. 2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977) 0 
Thus, even under the present status of the law as 
established by the Call case, plaintiffs are entitled to a trial 
as to whether the park fee is reasonably related to any increase 
need for recreation in the area created by the subdivision. 
For this reason, the lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs' 
Complaint should be vacated and the matter remanded for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court correctly entered summary judgment against 
Defendant. The imposition of a "hookup" fee for plaintiffs based 
upon all total lots in the subdivisions is clearly not permitted 
by Utah law. Plaintiffs are being charged for services to hundreds 
of lots which might not ultimately occur for many years. Other 
cities charge hookup fees only as each individual lot is developed 
-- Defendant must do the same. In addition, this prepayment 
scheme is unconstitutional since it violates both due process and 
equal protection. 
Finally, the lower court erred by dismissing plaintiffs' 
Complaint as to the Park Improvement Fee since it too is not autho-
rized under Utah law. In any event, plaintiffs are entitled to 
attack the reasonableness and necessity of such a fee in a trial 
on the merits as stated in the last Call decision. 
For these reasons, the order of summary judgment should be 
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affirmed and the order of dismissal reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CRAIG • COO 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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